The Oil Route
At roughly the same time, a similar policy seminar was under way at a base in central-western China. The difference was that this one was lower-level, with no senior leaders in attendance.
Lin Huaisheng sat in the back row, propping his head up, and had been listening for three hours. He was nearly asleep. At the podium, a very prominent international affairs expert was insisting that the United States did not want disorder in the Indian Ocean, and therefore the current conflict was nothing to worry about, because ultimately nothing would come of it. The expert kept hammering two points: first, that fears of India launching a full-scale assault on Pakistan were groundless. Second, that China and India shared common counter-terrorism interests, and this equilibrium must not be disturbed. Lin could not say precisely why, but he found the tone repellent.
"Since the 1970s, our national interest has always been to seek maximum advantage through accommodation with American interests. Why should we challenge America's global strategy? A few years ago, when I said these things, some people scoffed. And then our Chinese-invested port in Pakistan was attacked by militants time and again, at enormous cost. What a bitter lesson!" The expert rapped the table, sounding almost pleased with himself about the "lessons." Lin scratched his head. He very much wanted to throw his water bottle at the old bastard.
"Therefore, any geopolitical ambition is the most dangerous kind of thinking. Those of you in the audience may not know the extent of our dependence on Indian Ocean shipping routes for oil, or the CIA's hand behind the Balochi tribal militants who regularly attack our engineers. So my advice to the leadership has always been the same: do not pursue ambitions in the Indian Ocean direction. In 1962 we had no oil import problem. The situation is different now. Let America deal with the Pakistan question. Why not?" The expert spoke of these matters lightly, as though discussing somewhere very far away.
"Senior Researcher Gao, what if Pakistan is dismembered and America stands by and watches? What then?" A colonel in the front row challenged the expert bluntly.
"It won't happen. Absolutely not. I guarantee it. The United States has more than enough means to restrain India's expansionist impulse." The expert bulldozed the question with sheer assertiveness, offering no real explanation. Lin did not want to speak up; debating international politics in the abstract was not his strength. But his mind went to Plan 4157B. If the moment came and they sat idle while Pakistan was torn apart, it would be more than a territorial dispute. India would become unassailably powerful. This made the expert's views seem severely lopsided.
The lecture continued unchallenged.
"I know many of you are military men. There is an absurd view circulating within the armed forces that the India-Pakistan war is our strategic opportunity. I must remind you: this is a thoroughly impractical idea. This year we will import close to 300 million tonnes of oil, mainly from Africa and the Middle East. Russia and Venezuela can supply only about fifteen per cent of our annual needs. In other words, the vast majority of our oil depends on Indian Ocean shipping routes. The facts are plain. We cannot take such a risk."
"But we are currently studying a proposal to build an oil pipeline from Gwadar port in Pakistan,"1 the colonel in the front row pressed.
"Lay a pipeline across the Karakoram into the Chinese heartland? I'm quite certain the length would be at least three times the China-Myanmar oil pipeline, and the investment more than ten times."
Lin shook his head. He thought the expert was deliberately inflating the numbers.
"Moreover, Gwadar's water depth is only fourteen metres; insufficient for large tankers. The port's value is therefore limited." The expert's statistics dispatched the colonel easily. This made Lin deeply uncomfortable, but he had no fresh arguments to rebut the man.
Murmuring broke out below. The expert was disagreeable, but this last point was hard to dispute. The navy could not protect oil shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. If war with India came, this was a problem that could not be avoided.
New Delhi. The Prime Minister's residence, basement.
It was now Defence Minister Singh's turn to speak. He was outlining the planned military operations. Prime Minister Kahan sat nearby, smiling, listening to his minister discuss the offensive.
"The first phase, beginning immediately, will be a sustained air campaign. We will attrit the Pakistan Air Force to the maximum extent. Theirs is a force of only four hundred combat aircraft. But if we continue the current pattern of limited strikes that do not cross the Line of Control, we cannot effectively exploit our advantage."
"Beyond limited strikes, you mean…?" Foreign Secretary Chandra interjected cautiously.
"We will strike all targets in depth."
"Targets in depth?"
"Simply put: every military airfield marked on the map. Destroy their aircraft on the ground. Deny them the ability to take off, land, or maintain their machines."
"But the consequence of that is tantamount to a declaration of war. We would face international sanctions more severe than those after the 1998 nuclear tests."
"Minister, international sympathy is currently on our side. I would ask you to note that fact." Prime Minister Kahan spoke up, rescuing Singh.
"Think about it. After 9/11, what did the Americans do? Did they show any patience? This is the most natural response to a terrorist event. The West will understand." The Prime Minister continued, unperturbed.
"Prime Minister, that was America, not India." Chandra was close to tears. Pasad sat in silence beside him. He was a soldier; it was not his turn to speak.
"Yesterday I telephoned President Petrov2 and spoke with him for an hour. He fully understands our counter-terrorism position. The President told me that the Russian Federation will, at the critical moment, cast a veto in the Security Council. So there will be no UN resolution or presidential statement against India." The Prime Minister spoke with complete assurance.
"But Prime Minister, the Russians frequently betray their friends, especially with informal commitments like this," Chandra said. He had thrown caution to the wind and was now contradicting the Prime Minister directly.
"I am certain Russia will support us. Russia has no interests in Pakistan. Their interest lies in our arms contracts. If the conflict drives up oil prices, they benefit even more." Kahan began expounding his reasoning. Chandra could not rebut arguments this full of holes; it would be like trying to find the biggest gap in a tattered net. A completely futile exercise.
"Shall I continue?" Singh asked the Prime Minister.
"Please." By now it was obvious to most of the room that every hawkish position had been authorised by the Prime Minister personally. Singh had effectively evolved from a civilian politician with only regimental-level command experience into India's de facto supreme military commander.
"The large-scale air campaign will begin tonight at eleven. We have prepared a comprehensive plan. Our air force will launch continuous strikes from western bases. This is the only way to neutralise the threat posed by Pakistan's elite squadrons, while allowing our numerical and technological advantages to be brought fully to bear. Within days, Pakistan will be forced to relocate whatever aircraft they can still fly to airfields near the Afghan border. At that point, their air force will cease to be a factor."
The attendees exchanged glances. Things were moving fast. Singh already had a detailed battle plan. But his hasty strategy had one critical gap: Pakistan was, after all, a nuclear-armed state. He had said nothing about how to deal with that.
"Has any consideration been given to their using tactical nuclear weapons in retaliation?" an official asked.
"Every Pakistani aircraft and missile site capable of delivering nuclear weapons is under our continuous surveillance,"3 Singh replied, slowly and definitively. A number of those present were shaking their heads. No one quite trusted a guarantee like that.
1. Gwadar (瓜达尔): Gwadar Port in Balochistan, developed by China as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The proposed pipeline across the Karakoram connecting Gwadar to western China has been discussed for decades but never built, due to the extreme terrain and cost. The expert's dismissal of Gwadar's strategic value reflects a real debate within Chinese policy circles. ↩
2. President Petrov (彼得罗夫总统): The fictional Russian president. Combined with the anecdote in C11N2 about Sami shooting down a Soviet pilot who later became Russia's president, the novel creates a multi-layered Russian connection; the same man Sami once captured is now providing diplomatic cover for India. ↩
3. Nuclear surveillance: Singh's guarantee echoes a persistent theme in Indian strategic discourse: the belief that India's intelligence and surveillance capabilities can track Pakistan's nuclear delivery systems. In reality, Pakistan's nuclear posture relies on dispersal, concealment, and road-mobile systems precisely to defeat such surveillance. Pasad's silence here is eloquent. ↩